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The rather mundane reality is that every new technology can serve as a vehicle for criminal 
behavior, and the Internet is no exception. The extraordinary dimensions of this new technology, 
however, are its rapid growth and infinite capacity to make communication both universal and 
instantaneous. The planet, in a sense, becomes a replicant of the human cortex: billions of 
neurons synaptically firing at random or in concert, multitasking without interference—prefrontal 
websites, hemispheric chat rooms, temporal lobe flaming, occipital e-mail.
—Meloy, The Psychology of Stalking: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives (1998, p. 10)
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As organizations like IBM focus more energy on projects like the Second Life Virtual World and remotely 
controlled homes, the interdigitation between the physical and virtual worlds will continue to increase, cre-
ating new opportunities for criminal activity. Although it may be some time before we have virtual murders, 
offenders are currently using the Internet to acquire victims, gather information, fabricate alibis, protect or 
alter their identities, and communicate with other offenders. Terrorists are making extensive use of comput-
ers and the Internet to plan attacks, avoid apprehension, and communicate with the public. For instance, 
computers played a role in the planning and subsequent investigations of both World Trade Center bomb-
ings. Ramsey Yousef’s laptop contained plans for the first bombing and, during the investigation into Zacarias 
Moussaoui’s role in the second attack, more than 100 hard drives were examined (United States v. Moussaoui; 
United States v. Salameh et al.; United States v. Ramsey Yousef). Even traditional violent crimes in which the key 
forensic evidence is usually physical, such as homicide and sexual assault, can involve digital evidence either 
directly or incidentally (Reust, 2006a).
Fortunately for investigators, computers record the actions and words of offenders and victims, creating a 
behavioral archive that can give insight into their thoughts, choices, motivations, interests, and desires. Given 
its ubiquity and investigative usefulness, investigators must learn to recognize digital evidence and to inter-
pret it from a behavioral standpoint. It might not be obvious, particularly at the outset of an investigation, 
that a computer or the Internet holds key evidence, so it is advisable to search for potential digital evidence 
in all cases. This chapter discusses the usefulness of digital evidence in any type of criminal investigation and 
provides practical guidance for including digital evidence in the deductive criminal profiling process. The pre-
dominant focus is on using digital evidence in investigations of violent crime, but a portion of this chapter 
discusses how criminal profiling may be applied in investigations of computer intrusions and fraud.
CrIme and Computers
Not surprisingly, as computers and networks become more prevalent, investigators are encountering an 
increasing amount of digital evidence of witness, victim, and criminal activity (Casey, 2004). Forensic exam-
ination of a floppy diskette that was sent to a television station by the Bind Torture Kill (BTK) serial killer led 
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Key terms
Prosecutors upgraded the charge against Robert Durall, 40, 
to first-degree murder based on what they described as evi-
dence of premeditation found on his office computer. Durall 
had been charged with second-degree murder, but a co-
worker told police he had discovered a number of tempo-
rary files on Durall’s office computer that showed Durall had 
 conducted Internet searches using key words like kill + spouse, 
 accidental + deaths, smothering, poison, homicides, and mur-
der, according to court documents. A plus sign tells the search 
engine to pull up only sites that use both terms as key words 
(Washington v. Robert A. Durall, 2003).
Case example: premedItated FIrst-degree murder
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investigators to the church where Dennis Rader was council president. In another serial homicide case, 
investigators tracked down Maury Travis using a map that he had printed from the Expedia Web site and had 
sent to a reporter in St. Louis to show where another body was located.
A criminal can use the Internet proactively to enhance a modus operandi (MO) or he can use it reactively 
to avoid detection and capture (Turvey, 2000). For example, John E. Robinson, who referred to himself as 
“Slavemaster,” used the Internet to con some of his victims into meeting him, at which time he sexually 
assaulted some and killed others (Rizzo, 2001). Robinson first used newspaper personal ads to attract vic-
tims and then used the Internet to extend his reach (McClintock, 2001). Robinson also used the Internet 
reactively to conceal his identity online, often hiding behind the alias “Slavemaster.” When Robinson’s 
home was searched, five computers were seized.
The Internet gives offenders greater access to victims, extending their reach from a limited geographical 
area to victims all around the world. Additionally, the Internet contains a significant amount of personal 
information about individuals, enabling a predator to search for particular types of potential victims. “One 
offender might search the Web for potential victims who are involved with church groups or online Bible 
discussions. Another offender might search for potential victims of a specific age by sifting through personal 
Web pages or AOL [America Online] user self-descriptions. Sexual predators can lurk in a Usenet news-
group dedicated to victims of abuse (e.g., alt.abuse.recovery), or they may choose a particular online venue 
because it attracts potential victims who are located geographically near them” (McGrath and Casey, 2001). 
Furthermore, by giving offenders access to victims over an extended period of time (rather than just a brief 
encounter), the Internet enables offenders to gain control of their victims or to gain their victims’ trust and 
possibly to arrange a meeting in the physical world.
In 2000, Lawrence Stackhouse found 15-year-old Diana Strickland’s online profile, contacted her using the 
Internet, and then groomed1 her until she and a girlfriend agreed to travel to his home in Pennsylvania, 
where he exploited them sexually for four days until the girlfriend called the police (“Protect Children 
from Predators on Internet, Parents Tell Congress,” 2000). Also in 2000, e-mail and AOL instant messages 
provided the compelling evidence to convict Sharee Miller of conspiring to kill her husband and abet-
ting the suicide of the admitted killer she had seduced with the assistance of the Internet. Miller carefully 
controlled the killer’s perception of her husband, going so far as to masquerade as her husband to send 
the killer  offensive messages (“Sex, Lies and Murder: Michigan v. Miller,” 2001). In December 2004, Lisa 
Montgomery used an Internet chat room to contact 23-year-old Bobbie Jo Stinnett about looking at rat 
 terriers the Stinnetts sold over the Internet. Montgomery later admitted to strangling Stinnett and cutting 
her open to kidnap her baby.
In late December 2005, 27-year-old Josie Phyllis Brown was reported missing in Baltimore. Digital evi-
dence led investigators to a 22-year-old college student, John Gaumer. Brown and Gaumer met on the 
Internet site MySpace.com and arranged to meet for a date (Associated Press, 2006). On the night of her 
disappearance, Brown’s mobile telephone records showed that she had talked to Gaumer before meeting 
with him, and police traced her telephone to a location many miles from where Gaumer claimed to have 
left her that night. After the web of evidence converged on Gaumer in February 2006, he led police to her 
body and admitted to beating Brown to death after their date. Gaumer used the Internet extensively to 
communicate with and to meet potential dates. Part of the evidence against him was a digital recording 
of “thumping noises, shouting and brief bursts of a woman’s muffled screams” apparently created when 
1 Grooming is a general term used to describe the process by which a sexual predator gains control over his victim. According to 
Johnson (1997), “Perpetrators attempt to build both a trusting and fear-based relationship with their victim, with an end goal of being 
able to get sexual contact without significant resistance.”
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Gaumer’s mobile phone inadvertently dialed Brown’s phone number (McMenamin, 2007). In his confes-
sion to police, Gaumer stated that he removed her nose, jaw, teeth, and most of her fingertips in an attempt 
to thwart identification of her body and that he later sent an e-mail to her account to make it appear that 
he did not know she was dead.
CyBertraIls
Everyday activities leave a significant amount of digital data lying around. Third parties, such as mobile 
 telephone providers, banks, credit card companies, and electronic toll collection systems, can reveal signifi-
cant information about an individual’s whereabouts and activities and are a staple source of evidence for 
criminal investigators.
Even when they are not consciously using networks, offenders and victims leave digital footprints as they 
move through the world, creating cybertrails that an investigator may be able to retrace to reconstruct where 
they were and what they were doing at particular times. For example, records from a missing person’s mobile 
telephone provider or car navigation system may indicate where the person went and when.
Similarly, the computers and other digital devices, including cell phones and PDAs, that people use at home 
and work contain remnants of documents, photographs, Internet communications, and other details that 
generally reveal a great deal about their daily life, inner thoughts, and motivations. For example, Web brows-
ers on a computer often maintain a list of all pages that have been viewed and can temporarily store recently 
viewed content in a cache to improve performance. This cached data can include Web-based e-mail and 
other activities that may be useful to investigators. Data that have been “deleted” often remain on a com-
puter indefinitely and may be recoverable using digital forensic techniques and tools. Information posted 
on the Internet that an individual later altered or removed may also be recoverable through archives like the 
Way Back Machine (www.archive.org).
Handheld devices may contain entries or photographs that capture ongoing criminal activity or indicate 
where the victim was or whom she met with at a particular time. In an alleged rape case, a forensic exam-
iner recovered cell-phone video that showed Dominic Jones having sex with a woman who had apparently 
passed out after drinking (Chanen and Xiong, 2007).
Various log files on servers may provide useful evidence in a case involving the Internet. For instance, send-
ing an e-mail usually generates a record of the sender’s location at a particular time, leaving traces on the 
device used by the sender, intermediate e-mail servers, and the recipient’s computer. Therefore, in addition 
to looking for the contents of e-mail, an investigator can determine what messages passed through the sys-
tem. If a message has been deleted to conceal a crime and cannot be recovered, there may still be evidence of 
its existence in the server’s log files. Additionally, many e-mail server logs contain information about when 
individuals checked their e-mail, potentially recording their whereabouts at a particular moment.2
The detailed and personal nature of information that may be available on the Internet is demonstrated by 
the online statements and interactions between Taylor Behl and Ben Fawley (Bardsley and Huff, 2007). Behl 
went missing on September 5, 2007, and her body was found a month later in an isolated rural area that 
Fawley was familiar with. Fawley subsequently admitted to killing Behl and was convicted in August 2006. 
Behl’s postings on Livejournal.com using the nickname “tiabliaj” were akin to online diary entries describing 
2 An e-mail program can be configured to periodically download e-mail automatically without requiring the user to be present at the 
keyboard. This emphasizes that care must be taken when interpreting digital evidence and attributing online activities to an individual.
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her thoughts and personal life, including interactions with Fawley. Fawley maintained a number of Web pages 
that contained a variety of information about him (Figure 15.1). The information in Figure 15.1, from one 
of Fawley’s Web pages, includes various Internet accounts with the name “Skulz,” a photograph of computer 
parts, and an indication that Fawley used both Windows and Macintosh operating systems. Another Web 
page that Fawley maintained under the nickname “line-nowhere” indicated that he had a number of com-
puters: “I use MSIE on five of my PC’s. I have Safari on the crapMac, but I have just added Firefox to three of 
my PC’s as I find MSIE is a royal pain in the ass.” When police searched Fawley’s home, they seized significant 
amounts of computer equipment and storage media, as well as digital cameras and mobile telephones.
As the following examples demonstrate, while sexual predators exploit the Internet to identify and attract 
victims and facilitate their crimes, criminal investigators can exploit their associated cybertrails to track the 
whereabouts of the perpetrators and document their activity:
n A sexual predator might frequent AOL chat rooms because AOL has a high percentage of new Internet 
users who are not yet familiar with the risks of this new medium. Locating and examining the 
offender’s AOL account could lead to valuable digital evidence. Recording all of the offender’s chat 
sessions could result in a wealth of behavioral evidence.
n A sexual predator might frequent a local chat room to gain access to local victims. Determining that 
the offender is located in a certain area significantly limits the suspect pool. Monitoring chat rooms 
that attract individuals from that geographic area may lead to the offender or other victims.
Figure 15.1
Ben Fawley’s Web page on deviantart.com showing interests and computer-related information.
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n A sexual predator might frequent Usenet (alt.abuse-recovery, alt.teen-advise, alt.torture) looking for 
a specific kind of victim expressing particular vulnerabilities. A search of Usenet archives may lead to 
useful information about the offender.
n A sexual predator might post online personal ads or use online dating services to acquire a certain kind 
of victim. The ad/dating service may have log files containing the IP address(es) that the suspect used 
to post information or may have records that lead to other victims.
Even if digital evidence does not contain the “smoking gun,” it can reveal actions, positions, origins, asso-
ciations, activities, and sequences useful for reconstructing the events surrounding an offense (Casey, 2006). 
Therefore, whether computers and networks are involved directly or indirectly, it is productive for investiga-
tors to view cybertrails as an extension of the physical world, as opposed to a completely irrelevant and sep-
arate space. Taking this viewpoint enables investigators to incorporate cybertrails and the associated digital 
evidence into the investigative reconstruction process detailed in this text.
The primary assumption in deductive criminal profiling is that the choice of victims, the choice of crime 
scenes, and the actions of an offender in executing a crime provide telling information about the perpetra-
tor. This assumption can be applied to cybertrails because (1) computers and networks are an extension of, 
and another means to mediate, the physical world; and (2) computer technology does not fundamentally 
change human behavior, but instead is simply a tool that facilitates, and captures virtual instances of, activ-
ity. An individual may do things on the Internet that he or she would not do in the physical world, but those 
online activities are still recognizable as, and reflective of, that person’s behavior.
Just as following an offender’s cybertrails can improve a profile, the profiling process can direct investigators 
to additional sources of digital evidence, as the following case examples demonstrate.
An individual was receiving anonymous threatening e-mail 
messages that made her fear for her life. The messages were 
sent through an anonymous e-mail service, making it difficult 
for investigators to identify the sender or origin of the mes-
sages. However, information contained in the messages sug-
gested that the sender was in the same organization as the victim. 
Investigators believed that the sender would have  initially sent 
himself a test message to ensure that no identifying informa-
tion was disclosed in the e-mail header. The log files of the 
organization’s e-mail server showed that one other individual 
in the organization had received a message from the same 
anonymous e-mail service. When this individual’s computer 
was examined, an abundance of digital evidence was found 
indicating that he was responsible for the threatening e-mail.
Case example: death threat
In an extortion case, the offender sent a message to the vic-
tim from a Web-based e-mail account. The Internet protocol 
(IP) address contained in the e-mail header showed that the 
message was sent from a computer located in an Internet café, 
but investigators were unable to determine who was using the 
computer at the time. Believing that the offender may have 
checked the Web-based e-mail account for responses to his 
message, investigators obtained all records relating to that 
account from the Internet service provider. These records indi-
cated that the offender had indeed connected to the e-mail 
account from his home computer.
Case example: BlaCKmaIl
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Digital evidence may be scattered across different media sources and in multiple online sites, and a profile 
of the perpetrator may help investigators identify other investigative steps to find additional sources of 
 evidence. For example, if a profile indicates that the current victim probably was not the first to be targeted 
by the offender, investigators will be motivated to seek evidence relating to other victims. A profile may 
also suggest to investigators what types of victims to look for and where the offender might have come into 
contact with them.
As offenders become more aware of digital forensic techniques, they are employing concealment tools and 
techniques, such as encryption, misleading file names, or disk wiping. Therefore, it is important for a pro-
filer to consider when digital evidence should be present but is absent. Given such direction, a trained foren-
sic examiner may be able to recover and use these data to reveal evidence that a criminal sought to hide, and 
the examiner may thereby glean a great deal about an individual’s activities.
proFIlIng Computer CrImInals
To date, the majority of efforts to apply profiling to crimes involving computers has focused on criminals 
who target computers. In one study, computer criminals were split into the following categories (Icove, 
Seger, and VonStorch, 1995):
n Computer crackers: groups and individuals
n Computer criminals: espionage and fraud/abuse
n Vandals: strangers and users.
In another study, hackers were stereotyped as white, middle-class, obsessive antisocial males between 12 and 
28 years old, with an inferiority complex and a possible history of physical and sexual abuse (Rogers, 1999). 
Several other attempts have been made to create general profiles of computer criminals using information 
from media reports, offender interviews, and anecdotal observations.
Although these efforts to create inductive profiles give a general overview of past offenders and may be use-
ful for diagnosing and treating associated psychological disorders, they are of limited use in an investigation. 
In fact, such generalizations about criminals may be misleading, prompting investigators to make incor-
rect assumptions about an offender. Since investigators usually require particulars rather than generaliza-
tions, criminal profiles should contain specific conclusions, substantiated by evidence. If a generalization is 
deemed necessary, it should be made with great care and extensive research or it is likely to be unhelpful in 
an investigation.
Studying past crimes can help investigators assess offenders and their motives and make strategic decisions 
in an investigation. Researchers concerned with computer-related crime have focused on dangerous critical 
information technology insiders (CITI)—individuals who threaten critical infrastructures from within an 
organization (Shaw, Ruby, and Post, 1998). This research focuses on threat assessment, attempting to pre-
dict the future behavior of high-risk individuals to mitigate the damage they might cause. According to this 
research, all CITIs have one common trait—introversion, which makes them “less likely to deal with stress 
Behavioral analysis of a sexual predator directed undercover 
investigators to particular online chat rooms that the offender 
trawled for victims and enabled investigators to pose as the 
type of victim that attracted the offender.
Case example: ChIld exploItatIon
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in an overt, constructive manner, and less likely to seek direct assistance” (Shaw, Post, and Ruby, 1999). CITIs 
are also more likely to express their problems via e-mail than in person. Studies have identified six high-risk 
characteristics: a history of personal and social frustrations, computer dependency, ethical flexibility, reduced 
loyalty, a sense of entitlement, and a lack of empathy. These studies also provide several motivational catego-
ries in an effort to help identify and evaluate the risks associated with problem individuals (Table 15.1). 
These motivational categories overlap with those mentioned in Chapter 13: power reassurance (compensa-
tory), power assertive (entitlement), anger retaliation, and profit oriented.
More recent empirical studies provide additional insight into computer crimes committed by individuals 
within an organization. In studies by the Secret Service/Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering 
Institute (Keeney et al., 2005; Randazzo et al., 2004) and the Defense Personnel Security Research Center 
(Shaw and Fischer, 2005), the majority of the crimes surveyed had a profit motive, with some level of anger 
retaliation. Although the criminal activity was committed using computers, the method of attack was often 
nontechnical, generally taking advantage of the business to embezzle funds. The importance of digital evi-
dence in these investigations was perhaps lower than one might expect, emphasizing the need to combine 
digital forensics with traditional investigative techniques like criminal profiling. In 74% of the cases sur-
veyed, system logs helped identify the insider, while in 30% of the cases forensic examination of the targeted 
network, system, or data helped identify the subject.
table 15.1 Motivational Categories of Critical Information Technology Insiders
Category Motivational Descriptive Summary and Demonstrative Example
Explorers Motivated by curiosity, rarely cause purposeful damage. Example: Idle employees access 
poorly protected network resources that they are not officially authorized to access.
Good samaritans Motivated by a desire to “save the day” or to show off their abilities. Example: A system 
administrator on one system identifies a vulnerability on another system that is not the 
administrator’s responsibility and breaks into the vulnerable system to fix it rather than 
informing the responsible system administrator.
Hackers Motivated by a need to bolster self-esteem by violating access boundaries. Example: An 
individual connects his employer’s secure network to the Internet in violation of policy, 
providing his friends on the Internet with access to the secure system and sensitive 
information it contains.
Machiavellians Motivated by personal gain, damaging people and systems to achieve their goals. Example: 
An individual who enjoys traveling introduces malfunctions in her employer’s equipment 
abroad so that she will be sent to other countries to repair the systems.
Exceptions Believe that they are special and entitled to special treatment. Example: A system 
administrator has unique knowledge of an organization’s computer systems and feels that 
he deserves better pay, benefits, and treatment than other employees.
Avengers Motivated by specific perceived wrongs. Example: A system administrator hears that she 
is going to be laid off, so she encrypts patient files and holds them ransom in the hope of 
getting a better severance package.
Career thieves Motivated by profit. Example: An individual embezzles money using an organization’s 
computer system.
Moles Motivated by profit but indirectly through espionage. Example: An individual who joins an 
organization with the express purpose of obtaining proprietary information that he can sell 
to competitors.
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psycholinguistic analysis of digital Communications
Shaw’s more recent work has expanded from managing insider threats to using deductive profiling tech-
niques in active investigations involving unknown offenders (Shaw, 2006, p. 26). Shaw uses a methodology 
called remote assessment and performs content analysis to extract information from written and spoken 
communications:
Remote assessment refers to a portfolio of methods used to evaluate individuals and groups when 
direct contact methods (interviews, questionnaires, etc.) are not feasible or desirable. Sometimes 
referred to as Unobtrusive Methods, these techniques have been used by researchers concerned 
about disturbing the natural environment of their subjects.
Shaw’s approach is useful when investigators have e-mail messages, Internet chat logs, or recorded audio 
that captures the offender’s words. E-mail messages, newsgroup posts, and other online statements may 
contain unusual or repeated verbal behaviors or show a level of planning and forethought related to a 
criminal act. Software that implements psycholinguistic analysis has been developed to process electronic 
communications and to highlight noteworthy characteristics for a human analyst to evaluate (Shaw and 
Stroz, 2004).
In addition to psycholinguistic analysis of content, Shaw’s remote assessment methodology takes into 
account the context of communications. The target, delivery method, time, related organizational events, 
and other context can give the profiler a better understanding of the offender and may reveal useful patterns 
of behavior. For example, an offender who attacks just before a company goes public may be attempting 
to harm the company financially. As another example, an offender’s use of concealment technology when 
communicating shows technical sophistication and may suggest that the offender is known to the victim. 
This type of assessment can give insight into the offender’s motives, state of mind, psychological disorders, 
and distinctive verbal behavior, such as unusual word usage or errors in spelling, that may help narrow the 
suspect pool. When dealing with an insider, such as an ex-employee, it may be possible to compare writing 
samples of potential suspects.
dIgItal BehavIor oF unKnown oFFenders
Criminal profiling can be most useful when little is known about the offender(s), which is particularly 
important when offenders use the Internet to conceal their identities and activities. Criminal profiling assists 
investigators by:
n Distinguishing whether a single offender committed multiple crimes or multiple offenders are 
involved
Each board member of a company received an anonymous 
letter viciously disparaging the CEO and aspects of the com-
pany’s operations, citing details that could only be known to 
an insider. Because of fears that the information in the letter 
might be made public and circulated to suppliers and cus-
tomers, an investigation was launched to identify the sender. 
After analyzing the profile of the author, a suspect pool of 
insiders was identified, and e-mail and other writings were 
compared to the anonymous letter writer, resulting in not 
only the sender’s identification but also a method for manag-
ing his relationship with the company to mitigate the risk of 
further harm.
Case example: angry InsIder
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n Providing likely offender characteristics to aid the technical investigation
n Identifying likely suspects from a given pool based on offender skill level, access to victim/target, and 
other technical characteristics
n Revealing modus operandi and signatures to help investigators search for related behaviors and to 
assess offender motivations
n Giving insight into offender motivations and general psychological state
n Assessing the dangerousness of offenders
n Revealing additional sources of evidence
In one case, a company and its customers were harassed by embarrassing e-mails containing derogatory 
information about the company and disturbing sexually explicit attachments that were spoofed to appear 
that company executives were the senders. After two years of repeated spoofed e-mail attacks, it remained 
unclear whether the perpetrator was an individual or a group, an insider or outsider, or even what the 
offender(s) wanted in order to stop their harassment.
Behavioral analysis of the harassing communications showed that one individual with a high technical 
skill level was responsible for all of the activities, and it indicated that the subject was a highly intelligent 
male over 30 who was extremely angry with the target company. This information led to further investi-
gation of other anonymous contacts that had not previously been associated with the perpetrator of the 
harassing e-mail attacks. E-mail communications were established with the perpetrator and, with the 
assistance of a behavioral psychologist, additional information about the perpetrator was elicited from 
him about his motivation, culminating in a cyber-extortion demand. In the negotiations over the extor-
tion demand, the perpetrator’s state of mind was regularly assessed to evaluate the level of danger he 
posed to others.3
In this investigation, digital forensic analysis of the company’s computer systems uncovered no evidence 
that the perpetrator was a malicious insider, but it did identify suspicious connections from computers at a 
nearby university, providing investigators with a solid lead and confirmation of an outside hacker. As sug-
gested by the profile, the offender was technically skilled enough to conceal his identity by using publicly 
accessible computers at university computer laboratories and wireless access points. Subsequent surveil-
lance of the locations used by the offender to send spoofed e-mails led investigators to a prime suspect who 
matched many of the characteristics detailed in the profile. Because the profile indicated that the offender 
might be dangerous and mentally unstable, investigators were cautious when they ultimately apprehended 
him. This case demonstrates how behavioral analysis of the digital evidence can provide investigators with 
information about the numbers of individuals involved in the criminal activity, the skill level of the indi-
viduals involved, other evidence that is actually related though may not superficially appear to be, and the 
physical security risk that the perpetrator poses.
An offender’s online activities may also indicate that the offender is taking precautionary measures to avoid 
identification and apprehension. For instance, some offenders protect themselves by using computer-smart 
nicknames, such as “En0ch|an” instead of “Enochian.” Because a search engine does not realize that the 
zero represents an “o” and the pipe (|) represents an “i,” a search for “En0ch|an” will not find information 
labeled with “Enochian.”4 Additionally, offenders may use anonymous or forged e-mail messages to con-
ceal their identities. Investigators should determine how much technical knowledge was required to perform 
such a task and whether every modification was necessary to conceal the person’s identity or whether the 
3 For further description of this case, see Howell (2006) and Shaw (2006).
4 To make matters worse, some search engines treat a pipe (|) as a separator and may therefore search for terms other than those specified.
Digital Behavior of Unknown Offenders 371
modifications were instead created to fulfill a psychological need of the offender. Explaining how and why 
the offender conceals his or her identity may lead investigators to identifying information that the offender 
failed to hide or may help investigators narrow the suspect pool (e.g., to people who were intimately famil-
iar with the victim and concealed their identify to avoid recognition by the victim).
Feeling protected by some level of anonymity, individuals often do things on the Internet that they would 
only imagine doing in the physical world and express thoughts that they would otherwise keep to them-
selves. Digital evidence may also contain information that can be used to determine the offender’s sex, age, 
occupation, interests, relationship status, and other potentially useful information. An offender’s Web site 
and online presence can give the viewer an impression of the offender’s self-image, state of mind, interests, 
and more. The choice of online nicknames can be revealing (e.g., Slavemaster, Zest, Dr. Evil), and an offend-
er’s Web pages may contain stories that give insight into his or her motives and fantasies and may have links 
to favorite areas online that can lead to other victims and additional evidence. This last point also applies to 
the physical world—an offender’s Web page may contain references to, or photographs of, favorite locations 
that can be useful when looking for other potential victims or sources of physical evidence.
A large company received an anonymous letter containing 
documents from an executive’s computer. In addition to the 
concerns raised by the documents, the fact that someone was 
able to obtain access to these sensitive materials without the 
executive’s knowledge raised security concerns. If the anon-
ymous whistle-blower had gained unauthorized access to 
the executive’s computer system or e-mail, this would have 
to be considered. A behavioral assessment helped focus the 
 investigation on a person morally offended by the executive’s 
activity, which was the subject of the documents and was a 
violation of corporate policy. The behavioral analysis of the 
anonymous whistle-blower’s activities on the company’s com-
puter systems also supported the assessment that the secu-
rity breach was specifically targeted at the executive and his 
activities and was not more far-reaching.
Case example: Internal oFFense
An offender’s admissions about state of mind, sexual fantasy, 
or personal/sexual conflict can provide insight into his or her 
behavior and motivations. For instance, in one traveler5 case, 
a profiler examined the offender’s online activities and con-
cluded that the offender believed he was genuinely in consen-
sual relationships with his young victims. “He sees nothing 
about his behavior as criminal or exploitative. He believes that 
he is merely seizing the day, and that what he is doing benefits 
the children he exploits. His motive is not to physically harm 
his victims but to be loved and admired by them. He confuses 
his own identity with theirs, to an extent, projecting a child-
like affect to them. An interview strategy that exploits these 
factors by being sympathetic to them will be successful in get-
ting the most information from this suspect.”
Case example: ChIld exploItatIon
5 A sexual predator who obtains victims online and then travels to meet them is commonly called a traveler.
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managIng oFFender BehavIor
An effective profile can help investigators decide whether attempts to contact and to communicate with 
the offender would be useful or harmful, and how to best approach the offender. It can also be helpful to 
know that certain sex offenders will confess to their crimes when treated in a certain manner, but the same 
approach may drive others into deeper denial.
In the same case involving the spoofed e-mails noted earlier, investigators decided to send an e-mail with 
a Web bug in an effort to learn more about an unknown offender. However, a profiler working on the case 
determined that the offender was highly skilled and would most likely notice and circumvent the tracking 
mechanism embedded in the e-mail. The profile also noted that the suspect was exhibiting signs of mental 
instability and was potentially dangerous. When law enforcement officers served a warrant at the suspect’s 
home, they found not only digital evidence connecting him with the offense but also firearms and the recipe 
and ingredients for a poisonous toxin called ricin.6
vICtImology
Given the growing number of people encountering and communicating with each other on the Internet, it is nec-
essary to consider the possibility that the offender had contact with the victim using the Internet. For instance, 
during the investigation of Robinson, cooperation between law enforcement agencies overcame potential physi-
cal linkage blindness, and victims’ bodies were located in two neighboring states (McClintock, 2001). Additional 
investigation of the offender’s activities, combined with interviews of online witnesses, may reveal that an offender 
communicated with other victims on the Internet who have not yet been identified. Conversely, in the case of 
missing victims, a thorough analysis of their computers might lead to a common offender. Therefore, as a rule, 
victimology should include a thorough search of the Internet, pertinent computers, and handheld devices.
For example, suppose the victim in a homicide accesses the Internet through Verizon and uses her Verizon 
e-mail account to communicate with friends and family, but uses Google Mail to communicate with strang-
ers. Her computer would contain e-mail from friends and family but might contain nothing to or from the 
strangers she encountered on the Internet. Of course, the diligent investigator would examine the victim’s Web 
browser history, see the many connections to gmail.com, and obtain the victim’s messages from Google.
In addition to exploring the possibility of an Internet link between the victim and offender, try to gain some 
understanding of the victim as an individual from his or her Internet activities. Every detail about the vic-
tim’s life and behavior contributes to one’s understanding of why that particular individual became a victim 
of a crime. Try to determine the what, why, where, how, and when of the victim’s Internet activities by ask-
ing questions like the following:
n Did the victim have Web pages, post to Usenet regularly, use chat networks, or send/receive e-mail 
or text messages on a mobile phone? The contents and context of any such online activities help a 
profiler understand the victim.
n Did the victim use a parent’s account, a personal account, or an anonymous account? If the victim was 
using an anonymous account, was he or she hiding from someone (e.g., abusive ex-boyfriend)?
n What did the victim get from the Internet that was not accessible otherwise (e.g., friendship, drugs, 
fantasy fulfillment)?
n Where did the victim access the Internet (e.g., at home, work, a café or bar)? Why did the victim pick 
that location to access the Internet (e.g., privacy, business, or to meet people face-to-face)?
6 For further description of this case, see Howell (2006) and (Shaw 2006).
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n Did the victim exhibit any behavior that sheds light on his or her mental state, sexuality, lifestyle, 
intelligence, or self-image? For example, was the victim involved with bondage and sadomasochism 
(BDSM) online groups?
n Are there discernible patterns in the victim’s Internet activities that suggest habits or schedules? Were 
there any breaks in these patterns around the time of the crime?
When looking for information on the Internet, investigators should not limit themselves to computer que-
ries. Interviewing individuals with whom the victim interacted on the Internet can uncover online nicknames 
and areas of the Internet that the victim used. A person’s private online hangouts can be the most revealing 
from a victimology standpoint and may be the way the offender crossed cybertrails with the victim.
It is also important to include digital evidence when assessing victim risk. Risk assessment on the Internet 
works in the same way as in the physical world, as the comparisons in Table 15.2 demonstrate.
table 15.2 Analogous Risks in the Real and Virtual Worlds
Risk Physical World Internet
High-risk victim Unattended child who talks with 
strangers while walking home from 
school
Unattended child in an Internet chat room 
who talks with strangers
High offender risk Offender who acquires victims in an area 
that is surveyed by security cameras
Offender who acquires victims in an 
area of the Internet that is monitored or 
recorded
Low-risk victim Individual who avoids going into certain 
areas unaccompanied and does not give 
personal information to strangers
Individual who avoids certain areas of 
the Internet and does not give personal 
information to strangers
Low offender risk Offender who wears a mask and 
performs covering behavior to avoid 
detection
Offender who uses anonymity provided 
by the Internet and performs covering 
behavior to avoid detection
A woman was being harassed and threatened over the Internet, 
primarily via a Hotmail account. The victim put a significant 
amount of personal information on the Internet, such as her 
age, home phone and address, background, photographs, and 
personal interests. The offender used a pseudo-anonymous 
e-mail account to hide his identity but did not have enough 
knowledge of the Internet to realize that the e-mail account 
did not provide complete anonymity (Hotmail headers con-
tain the IP address of the sender’s computer). Although the 
offender claimed to have located the victim through her Web 
page, he exhibited a high degree of familiarity with the vic-
tim’s surroundings (e.g., town, residence), suggesting that he 
spent a significant amount of time in the area. Additionally, 
the offender did not suggest a face-to-face meeting and did 
not use the victim’s phone number although it was provided 
on her Web page, perhaps because he was concerned that the 
victim would recognize or be repelled by him if they met or 
spoke. Perhaps the offender knew the victim or felt less confi-
dent/comfortable communicating in person. The e-mail mes-
sages contained some descriptions of the offender’s fantasies 
and suggested a degree of mental instability.
Case example: harassment
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The Internet can influence victim risk, putting an otherwise low-risk victim at high risk of certain crimes. 
For example, if a woman makes a large amount of personal information available on the Internet and par-
ticipates in online activities that expose her vulnerabilities, this can increase her risk of being stalked. If a 
woman who is reserved and cautious in the physical world uses the Internet to explore bondage and tor-
ture fantasies and arranges to meet an online acquaintance to act out these fantasies, this online activity can 
increase her risk of being raped or killed.
Individual pieces of digital data may not be useful on their own, but patterns of behavior can emerge when 
the pieces of digital evidence are combined. A victim might always check e-mail at a specific time or might 
always frequent a particular area on the Internet. A disruption in this pattern could be an indication of an 
unusual event—determining what that event was could generate a key lead. If there was no break in the vic-
tim’s routine, this consistency may help investigators hypothesize that the offender was aware of the victim’s 
routine and planned the crime accordingly or that the offender happened upon the victim and took advan-
tage of an opportunity. Discerning such patterns can be challenging when digital data are involved because 
there is often a massive quantity of information. Therefore, a thorough forensic analysis should always be 
performed to provide familiarity with the complete body of evidence and the opportunity to consider all 
possibilities before getting caught up with one detail or theory.
deduCtIve proFIlIng oF Computer Intruders
The same techniques discussed in this chapter can be useful for crimes committed on, not just using, com-
puters, such as data breach cases and network intrusions. When an offender uses the Internet to commit 
crimes, it can be difficult to pinpoint all of the relevant evidence in the digital vastness. Knowledge of a crim-
inal’s MO and signature is very useful when scouring the Internet for information regarding a case because 
it gives investigators a clearer sense of what to look for and where to look. The Internet, however, has many 
areas that are private and may never show up in a routine search. Sometimes an offender’s MO or signature 
will indicate that he uses one or another of these out-of-the-way places. Developing an understanding of the 
offender’s MO can direct investigators to look for particular traces of digital behavior or to monitor particu-
lar virtual areas where the intruder is likely to appear.
Sharon Lopatka traveled from Maryland to North Carolina to 
meet her killer. Friends described Lopatka as a normal woman 
who loved children and animals. Lopatka’s activities on the 
Internet give a very different impression, however. Lopatka 
was evidently interested in sex involving pain and torture. 
Victimology that did not include her Internet activities would 
have been incomplete, lacking the most relevant aspects of her 
character and would probably describe her as a low-risk victim 
when, in fact, she was quite a high-risk victim. For instance, 
in the murder of Sharon Lopatka, the victim’s home computer 
contained hundreds of e-mail messages that provided the cru-
cial link between the victim and the murderer, Robert Glass. 
Before these e-mails were found, investigators believed that 
they were dealing with a low-risk victim, and without these 
e-mails, it is unlikely that the investigators would have found 
the offender.
Case example: type “m” For murder
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For an in-depth example of MO and signature in the context of computer crime, consider the well-known 
case of Kevin Mitnick. Mitnick had an advanced MO that made it difficult to track him down. He would break 
into telephone networks, create a clever dial loop to hide his whereabouts, and use a cellular phone to dial 
into a large Internet service provider. He would then use advanced techniques to break into computers and 
steal software, credit cards, and data. A team that consisted of computer expert Tsutomu Shimomura and the 
FBI finally tracked Mitnick down using cellular-frequency direction-finding antennae. Although Mitnick’s 
main motivation seemed to be profit, he exhibited some other behaviors that were clearly not necessary to 
commit crimes (i.e., signature behaviors). For example, in addition to breaking into Shimomura’s computer 
and stealing advanced computer software, Mitnick allegedly left taunting voice messages on Shimomura’s 
voicemail, possibly as a form of power reassurance (www.takedown.com/evidence/voicemail).
An interesting aspect of MO in the context of computers arises when criminals take advantage of computer 
automation during the commission of a crime—automated actions and offender behavior can be difficult 
to differentiate. Automation can be particularly problematic when several criminals use the same automated 
tools. For example, programs exist that automate certain methods of breaking into computer systems and 
hiding incriminating evidence, providing an automated modus operandi that makes multiple offenders 
almost indistinguishable. When every crime scene looks almost identical, it becomes more difficult to link 
cases committed by a single offender and to understand the unique motivations of different offenders.
To make case linkage even more difficult, offenders who use the Internet can change their modus operandi 
with relative ease. As offenders become more familiar with the Internet, they usually find new ways to make 
use of it to achieve their goals more effectively. An offender who uses the Internet creatively can change his 
or her modus operandi so frequently and completely that it is best described as dynamic. For instance, indi-
viduals who break into well-secured computer systems may have to develop a novel intrusion plan for each 
unique target. A dynamic modus operandi has also been seen when an offender is consciously trying to foil 
investigators. For instance, when a stalker becomes aware that investigators are preventing one method of 
terrorizing the victim (e.g., e-mail), he or she uses another method (e.g., ICQ).
Investigators who are able to extract key behavioral information from available digital evidence and who can 
make sound deductions based on that behavioral evidence are invaluable in an investigation involving the 
Internet. Determination of motivation and intent can be critical when available evidence does not provide 
a complete picture of the offender’s actions. For instance, in data breach cases, one of the main questions 
that arises is whether the intruders gained access to confidential data stored on the compromised computer. 
When it is not possible to prove that the intruders did not access the data of concern, an assessment of their 
activities can reveal that their intent was not focused on the confidential data but rather to use the computer 
system for some other purpose, such as storage of contraband or to launch attacks against other systems on 
In a computer intrusion/information theft case, investiga-
tors determined how the offender operated and what he was 
looking for by carefully examining the compromised comput-
ers. Investigators used this knowledge to identify and monitor 
other machines on the network that would attract the intruder. 
After several hours, the intruder was detected on one of the 
systems being monitored, giving investigators one of the most 
vivid forms of evidence, a live recording of a crime in prog-
ress. While monitoring the intruder, investigators were able to 
determine that he was a recently fired employee who was dial-
ing into the network from his home. They quickly obtained a 
search warrant for his personal computer and found copies of 
the stolen information on the hard disk.
Case example: Computer Intruder Caught In the aCt
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the Internet (Casey, 2003). In one case, forensic examination of the target systems found that the motiva-
tion for computer breach was not to steal sensitive data but to find storage space for pirated movies (Reust, 
2006b). Additionally, investigators who can recognize signature behaviors in a digital setting are in a solid 
position to overcome the challenges of automated or dynamic modus operandi—they can use signature 
behaviors to link cases and make deductions about offenders.
Like an autopsy, the forensic analysis of the target computer systems will reveal a significant amount about 
an attack (Casey, 2004). However, it is important for investigators to realize that there may be other com-
puters that contain significant amounts of relevant digital evidence. Just as a crime in the physical world can 
have multiple crime scenes, computer intrusions can have primary and secondary scenes, each containing 
potentially useful information. Computer intruders often perform surveillance of a target computer from 
one location, move (virtually) to another location on the network to break into the target system (poten-
tially passing through several intermediate systems), gain unauthorized access to the target system and steal 
money or information, destroy the target system and all of the evidence it contains, and delete evidence 
on other systems that were used during the commission of the crime. A staging area used by a computer 
intruder may contain evidence related to the crime, tools left by the offender, and communications with 
cohorts, and could provide a link between an individual and the primary crime scene.
It can also be productive to perform a kind of victimology relating to the target computer(s) in an intru-
sion case. In crimes where computers are the targets, the underlying question is the same: Why did the 
offender choose the target computer, and what was the risk the offender was willing to take? Consider a well-
 protected computer, for example. If an offender overcomes many obstacles and exposes himself or herself 
to many risks to break into the computer, this ability may indicate that the offender was familiar with the 
target system, had a strong desire for something on the target system, and was skilled enough to overcome 
the obstacles and risks.
To assess victim risk when the target is a computer, gather information about the computer, including the 
make and model, the operating system, where it was located, what it contained, who had access to it, 
what other computers it regularly connected to, and how difficult it was to break into. Determine whether 
there were any previous unsuccessful attempts to access the computer. If an offender required a significant 
amount of knowledge about the target computer system to commit the crime, investigators should try to 
determine how this knowledge was obtained. Was it available only to employees of an organization? Could 
the offender have obtained the information through surveillance, and if so, what skill level and equipment 
were required to perform the surveillance?
In investigations of computer intrusions or violent crime, computers and the Internet may contain crucial 
information about the people involved. Profiling can utilize this rich repository of digitized human behav-
ior to aid an investigation and can direct investigators to other potential sources of digital evidence that 
might otherwise be overlooked.
summary
As computers and networks become more prevalent, investigators are encountering an increasing amount 
of digital evidence of witness, victim, and criminal activity. A criminal can use the Internet proactively to 
enhance his current modus operandi or he can use it reactively to avoid detection and capture. Additionally, 
the Internet gives offenders greater access to victims, extending their reach from a limited geographical area 
to victims all around the world.
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Everyday activities leave a significant amount of digital data lying around, especially from third parties, 
such as mobile telephone providers, banks, credit card companies, and electronic toll collection systems. 
Consequently, even when they are not consciously using networks, offenders and victims leave digital foot-
prints as they move through the world, creating “cybertrails” that an investigator may be able to retrace to 
reconstruct where these computer users were and what they were doing at particular times.
To date, the majority of efforts to apply profiling to crimes involving computers have focused on criminals 
who target computers. Although these efforts to create inductive profiles give a general overview of past 
offenders and may be useful for diagnosing and treating associated psychological disorders, they are of lim-
ited use in an investigation. They can even be misleading.
Criminal profiling can be most useful when little is known about the offender(s), which is particularly 
important when offenders use the Internet to conceal their identities and activities. Feeling protected by 
some level of anonymity, individuals often do things on the Internet that they would only imagine doing 
in the physical world, and they express thoughts that they would otherwise keep to themselves. Digital evi-
dence may also contain information that can be used to determine the offender’s sex, age, occupation, inter-
ests, relationship status, and other potentially useful information.
When an offender uses the Internet to commit crimes, it can be difficult to pinpoint all of the relevant evidence 
in the digital vastness. The Internet, however, has many areas that are private and may never show up in a rou-
tine search. Sometimes an offender’s MO or signature will indicate that he or she uses one or another of these 
out-of-the-way places. Developing an understanding of the offender’s MO can direct investigators to look for 
particular traces of digital behavior or to monitor particular virtual areas where the intruder is likely to appear.
Questions
1. True or False: Hackers are mostly teenagers who play video games and have too much time on their hands.
2. Explain how an automated modus operandi is made possible.
3. Cybertrails are often created passively. Give three examples of how this might occur.
4. What is the purpose of a dynamic modus operandi?
5. Why might a predatory sex offender troll America Online (AOL) for victims, as opposed to somewhere else?
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